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NPS is the Navyʼs Research University.
Location:  Monterey, CA
Students:        1500
■ US Military (All 5 services)
■ US Civilian (Scholarship for Service & SMART)
■ Foreign Military (30 countries)
■ All students are fully funded
Schools:
■ Business & Public Policy
■ Engineering & Applied Sciences
■ Operational & Information Sciences
■ International Graduate Studies
NCR Initiative:
■ 8 offices on 5th floor, 900N Glebe Road, Arlington
■ FY12 plans: 4 professors, 2 postdocs, 2 researchers
■ Immediate slots for .gov PhDs!
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The DOMEX challenge is to turn digital bits into actionable 
intelligence. 
Recent publications:
■ DoD Risks from Facebook
■ Ascription of Carved Data on multi-user systems
■ Forensic Carving of Network Packets and Associated Data Structures
■ Finding and Archiving the Internet Footprint
My current research: 













































1:30 - 3:45 Forensics Overview & Android Forensics
■ Forensics and digital Investigations (overview)
■ Challenges facing computer forensics today
■ Cell phone forensics (overview)
■ Forensics Targets in Android Phones
—Allocated vs. Residual Data
—Logical vs. Physical
■ FAT32 & YAFFS analysis
■ Clearing, Sanitization and Anti-forensics
■ Feature Extraction, Cross-Drive Analysis, and Research Opportunities
3:45 - 4:00 Break
4:00 - 5:00 Android System Analysis
■ Extracting the data
■ Open Source and Commercial Tools
■ Q&A







“Forensics” has two meanings.
fo·ren·sics n. (used with a sing. verb) 
The art or study of formal debate; argumentation. 
The use of science and technology to investigate and establish facts 
in criminal or civil courts of law. 
(American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Edition)
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Judges and juries can't examine physical evidence and make a 
determination
They don't have the expertise
■ Evidence may be open to interpretation. 
 
Courts settle disputes, redress grievances,
and mete out punishment
8
Even photographs may require interpretation
When were these photographs taken?  
Were they faked?
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The Commissar Vanishes documents how 
Stalin's Soviet Union tampered with the past.
Abel Yenukidze:
■ Shot during the purges of 1936-1938




Computer graphics are so realistic...
... it is easy to mistake a simulated photo for reality. 
—Can Digital Photos Be Trusted, Steve Casimiro, 9/11/2005, popsci.com
—Seeing is Not Believing, Steve Casimiro, Popular Science, Oct. 2005, 
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Most photos are not "doctored." 
■ But most photographs are not taken into court
If the interpretation of a photo is high-stakes...
■ ... then someone has an interest in the photo being doctored
This is true of all evidence
But it’s easier to doctor digital evidence
■ “Digital Doctoring: can we trust photographs?”
—Hany Farid, In Deception: Methods, Motives, Contexts
and Consequences, 2007
—http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/farid/





US courts employ an adversarial process. 
■ Prosecution (or plaintiff) & Defense hires its own experts. 
■ In some cases, the court may hire a third expert for the judge.
Forensic experts interpret scientific evidence.
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Investigators for the prosecution:
conduct the investigation and build the case. 
Criminal Digital Investigators:
■ Sworn Law Enforcement Officer (usually)
■ Writes search warrants
■ Receives computers, cameras, and other evidence
■ Acquires & analyzes data
■ Presents findings
■ Prepares report
■ Testifies in court
—True for most English-Speaking countries
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Investigators for the defense: 
rebut the evidence and create doubt.
Defense Experts:
■ Employed by the Defense
■ Works with defense attorney
■ Receives evidence from law enforcement
■ May conduct independent investigation, but usually funds do not permit
■ May work with other experts
■ May testify in court
A defense expert can win a case by showing:
■ Prosecution experts did not follow their own procedures
■ Prosecution experts improperly trained or incompetent
■ Chain-of-custody problems
■ No scientific basis for employed techniques
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Traditional forensics is dominated by the
Locard Exchange Principle
Dr. Edmund Locard (1877-1966) - "Every contact leaves a trace."
■ “Wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously, 
will serve as a silent witness against him. 
Not only his fingerprints or his footprints, but his hair, the fibers from his clothes, the glass 
he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he scratches, the blood or semen he 
deposits or collects. 
All of these and more, bear mute witness against him. This is evidence that does not 
forget. It is not confused by the excitement of the moment. 
It is not absent because human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. 
Physical evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly 
absent. Only human failure to find it, study and understand it, can diminish its 
value.
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Digital forensics applies these principles to computers.
Some definitions for computer forensics/digital forensics:
■ “Involves the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation, and interpretation of 
computer data.” 
—(Computer Forensics: Incident Response Essentials, Warren Kruse and Jay Heiser.)
■ “The scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital evidence in legal 
matters.”
—(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, http://www.swgde.org)
Digital evidence is:
■ “Information stored or transmitted in binary form  ... relied upon in court.” [Int02] 
■ “Information of probative value ...  stored or transmitted in binary form.” [Sci05] 
■ “[D]ata of investigative value ... stored ... or transmitted by a computer.” [Ass05] 
■ “[D]ata ... that support or refute a theory of how an offense occurred or that address 
critical elements ... such as intent or alibi.” [Cas04] 
If it involves computers, it's probably digital evidence
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many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to assess and was often left to the foreign
government services to judge. Intelligence Community HUMINT efforts against a closed society
like Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom were hobbled by the Intelligence Community's
dependence on having an official U.S. presence in-country to mount clandestine HUMINT
collection efforts.
(U) When UN inspectors departed Iraq, the placement of HUMINT agents and the
development of unilateral sources inside Iraq were not top priorities for the Intelligence
Community. The Intelligence Community did not have a single HUMINT source collecting
against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq after 1998. The Intelligence
Community appears to have decided that the difficulty and risks inherent in developing sources
or inserting operations officers into Iraq outweighed the potential benefits. The Committee
found no evidence that a lack of resources significantly prevented the Intelligence Community
from developing sources or inserting operations officers into Iraq.
When Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered
placing a CIA officer in Iraq years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction programs, a CIA officer said, "because it's very hard to sustain . . . it takes a
rare officer who can go in . . . and survive scrutiny | ^ | [ m | | | for a long time." The
Committee agrees that such operations are difficult and dangerous, but they should be within the
norm of the CIA's activities and capabilities. Senior CIA officials have repeatedly told the
Committee that a significant increase in funding and personnel will be required to enable to the
CIA to penetrate difficult HUMINT targets similar to prewar Iraq. The Committee believes,
however, that if an officer willing and able to take such an assignment really is "rare" at the CIA,
the problem is less a question of resources than a need for dramatic changes in a risk averse
corporate culture.
(U) Problems with the Intelligence Community's HUMINT efforts were also evident in
the Intelligence Community's handling of Iraq's alleged efforts to acquire uranium from Niger.
The Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the spouse of a CIA
employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes, however, that it is unfortunate,
considering the significant resources available to the CIA, that this was the only option available.
Given the nature of rapidly evolving global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons and weapons technology, the Intelligence Community must develop means to quickly
respond to fleeting collection opportunities outside the Community's established operating areas.
The Committee also found other problems with the Intelligence Community's follow-up on the
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Like mater, data can be evidence or the crime itself.
Evidence of a crime:
■ Financial records
■ Emails documenting a conspiracy
■ Photographs of a murder
The crime itself:




■ Threats sent by email
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The best digital evidence is proactively collected!
Systems can record and retain:
■ Log files — Recording events (syslog aggregation)
■ Disk images (Snapshots)
—Guidance Software’s EnCase Forensic
—Access Data’s FTK
■ Network packets and packet flows (Network Forensics)
—Network Flight Recorder (NFR)
—NetIntercept (Niksun)
Storage is cheap!
■ A 1TB drive holds more than a week’s worth of a consumer broadband traffic (@ 100%)
Proactive evidence allows investigators to discover:
■ How a crime was committed 
■ Extent of damage / Presence of illegal activity
■ Confirm/disprove an alibi
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A magic camera that can:
■ View previous versions of files
■ Recover “deleted” files
■ Find out what was typed
■ Report websites visited in the past
Why does this work?
■ Cache files and keep extensive logs
■ Web pages; wi-fi router logs
■ Residual Data — Programmers rarely clear memory when they are finished with it
■ free() doesn’t erase memory
—/bin/rm doesn’t overwrite sectors
—newfs and FORMAT* don't clear disks 
■ Most data is not encrypted
But digital evidence is easily faked!
Digital Forensics lets investigators go back in time...
(sort of.)
21
The Exchange Principle doesn't seem to apply to 
electronic media.
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When we look at a computer system, 
we build a hypothesis about the computerʼs past.
The hypothesis makes assumptions about:
■ The system under investigation:
—hardware  (stock hardware? modified? firmware?)
—software (stock? custom? patch level?)
■ The flow of time
■ The movement of evidence
■ The system being used to investigate the data
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Initial Configuration Event Data Copied
But any piece of digital evidence can be explained by 
multiple explanations.
Consider this printout:
07:16 AM Black:~/Downloads$ ls -l 
07:17 AM Black:~/Downloads$ ls -l
total 74
-rw-r--r--   1 simsong  simsong  73625 Jun 16 06:30 afyi.pdf
07:18 AM Black:~/afyi$ 
When was afyi.pdf downloaded?
■ Possible explanations:
—At 7:17 AM, but Safari set the timestamp to be the time on the server
—At 6:30AM on a different day; the file was moved into the directory. 
—The computer’s clock was changed before the file was downloaded
—The whole example was faked. 
The most likely explanation may not be correct one.
24
Likely assumptions are usually correct... 
but sometimes they are not.
We assume:
■ The event didn’t fake the initial configuration
■ Vulnerabilities we find were used by the attacker.
—The attacker could have created a new vulnerability to hide what was actually used
■ We can can copy all of the computer’s data
—We can’t get stuff out of L2 cache, some firmware, coprocessor, etc.
■ Our forensic tools are reliable
—The attack might be invisible due to a bug in the forensic tool
■ A Hypothesis-Based Approach to Digital Forensic Investigations, 
Brian D. Carrier, PhD. Thesis, Purdue University, 2006
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Initial Configuration Event Data Copied
Initial Configuration Event
Article I. General Provisions
Article II. Judicial Notice
Article III. Presumptions In Civil Actions And Proceedings
Article IV. Relevancy And Its Limits
Article V. Privileges
Article VI. Witnesses
Article VII. Opinions and Expert Testimony
Article VIII. Hearsay
Article IX. Authentication and Identification
Article X. Contents of Writings, Records and Photographs
Article XI. Miscellaneous Rules
In court, testimony is governed by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence
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US Federal Rules of Evidence 
Article VII regulates the testimony of “experts”
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts




Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if 
■ the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
■ the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
■ the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
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Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if 
■ the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
■ the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
■ the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
Note: specify your expert domain explicitly. 
If it’s too general, your expert status may be challenged.
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Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to the expert at or before the hearing. 
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or 
inference to be admitted. 
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed 
to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the 
court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial 
effect.”
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Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to the expert at or before the hearing. 
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or 
inference to be admitted. 
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed 
to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the 
court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial 
effect.”
This means that experts can rely on hearsay data, provided that it is 
supported by technical information.
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Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of 
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact
“(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or 
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or 
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental 
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of 
a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 
fact alone.”
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The “CSI Effect” causes victims and juries to have 
unrealistic expectations.
On TV:
■ Forensics is swift
■ Forensics is certain
■ Human memory is reliable
■ Presentations are highly produced
TV digital forensics:
■ Every investigator is trained on every tool
■ Correlation is easy and instantaneous
■ There are no false positives
■ Overwritten data can be recovered
■ Encrypted data can usually be cracked
■ It is impossible to delete anything
31
The reality of digital forensics is less exciting.
Every investigation is beset by problems:
■ Data that is overwritten cannot be recovered
■ Encrypted data usually can't be decrypted
■ Forensics rarely answers questions or establishes guilt
■ Forensics rarely provides specific information about a specific subject
■ Tools crash a lot
Traditionally this hasn’t mattered, because:
■ Most digital forensics was used to find child pornography
■ When the pornography is found, most suspects plead guilty
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Forensics has many uses beyond the courtroom.
Data Recovery:
■ Recover deleted files
■ Recover data from physically damaged media
Testing and Evaluating:
■ System Performance
■ Privacy Properties & Tools
■ Security Policies
Spot-check regulatory compliance:
■ Internal information flows





Forensics and Digital Investigations
Scientific evidence requires interpretation to get it into a court room:
■ You give a disk image to a jury
Digital evidence is easy to fake
■ You can completely wipe a computer or restore it’s hard drive
■ You just can’t do that with a physical crime scene
Main uses today of digital forensics:
■ Finding child pornography
■ Recovering deleted files
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Open Question:
Does Locardʼs Exchange Principle apply to flash media?
Magnetic media and flash media are fundamentally different
Magnetic Media
—Sectors overwritten in place
—Each sector can be rewritten billions of times
—Designed around magnetic remanence
■ Flash
—Sectors overwritten in different locations
—Each sector can be rewritten thousands of times
—Flash Translation Layer (FTL) maps logical-to-physical sectors
Today most forensic tools treat flash as magnetic media




Today there is a growing digital forensics crisis.
Much of the last decade's progress is quickly becoming irrelevant
Tools designed to let an analyst find a file and take it into court
… don't scale to today's problems
We have identified 5 key problems.
37
Problem 1 - "Increased cost of extraction & analysis.
Data: too much and too complex!
■ Increased size of storage systems
■ Cases now require analyzing multiple devices
—2 desktops, 6 phones, 4 iPods, 2 digital cameras = 1 case
■ Non-removable flash
—It’s hard to physically get to the data
■ Proliferation of operating systems, file formats and connectors
—XFAT, XFS, ZFS, YAFFS2, Symbian, Pre, iOS, 
Consider FBI Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories growth:
■ Service Requests:      5,057 (FY08)  ➔  5,616 (FY09)  (+11%)
■ Terabytes Processed: 1,756 (FY08)  ➔  2,334 (FY09)  (+32%)
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Problem 2 — RAM and malware forensics is really hard. 
RAM Forensics—in its infancy
■ RAM structures change frequently (no reason for consistency)
■ RAM is constantly changing
Malware is especially hard to analyze:
■ Encryption; Conditional execution
■ Proper behavior of most software is not specified
Malware can hide in many places:
■ On disk (in programs, data, or scratch space)




■ Motherboard, South Bridge, etc
■ FPGAs
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We present an integrated security model for a low-cost lap-
top that will be widely deployed throughout the developing
world. Implemented on top of Linux operating system, the
model is designed to restrict the laptop’s software without
restricting the laptop’s user.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6.c [Security and Privacy Protection]: Cryptographic






Within the next year more than a million low-cost laptops
will be distributed to children in developing world who have
never before had direct experience with information tech-
nology. In two years’ time the number of laptops should rise
to more than 10 million. The goal of this “One Laptop Per
Child” project is to use the power of information technology
to revolutionize education and communications within the
developing world.
Each of these children’s “XO” laptops will run a vari-
ant of the Linux operating system and will participate in
a wireless mesh network that will connect to the Internet
using gateways located in village schools. The laptops will
be equipped with web browsers, microphones and cameras
so that the students can learn of the world outside their
communities and share the details of their lives with other
children around the world.
Attempting such a project with existing security mecha-
nisms such as anti-virus and personal firewalls would likely
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SOUPS 2007 Pittsburgh, PA
Copyright 200X ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$5.00.
Figure 1: The XO Laptop
be disastrous: soon after deployment, some kind of mali-
cious software would inevitably be introduced into the lap-
top communities. This software might recruit the million-
plus laptops to join “botnets.” Other attackers might try
to disable the laptops out of spite, for sport, as the basis
of an extortion attempt, or because they disagree with the
project’s stated goal of mass education.
Many computer devices that are seen or marketed as “ap-
pliances” try to dodge the issue of untrusted or malicious
code by only permitting execution of code that is crypto-
graphically signed by the vendor. In practice, this means the
user is limited to executing a very restricted set of vendor-
provided programs, and cannot develop her own software or
use software from third party developers. While this ap-
proach certainly limits possible attack vectors, it is not a
silver bullet, because even vendor-provided binaries can be
exploited—and frequently are.
A more serious problem with the “lock-down” approach is
that it would limit what children could do with the laptops
that we hope to provide. The OLPC project is based, in
part, on constructionist learning theories [15]. We believe
that by encouraging children to be masters of their comput-
ers, they will eventually become masters of their education
and develop in a manner that is more open, enthusastic and
creative than they would with a machine that is locked and
not “hackable.”
Problem 3 — Mobile phones are really hard to examine.
Cell phones present special challenges
No standard connectors
■ No standard way to copy data out
■ Difficult to image & store cell phones without changing them. 
How do we validate tools against thousands of phones?
■ No standardized cables or extraction protocols
NIST's Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics 
recommends:
■ "searching Internet sites for developer, hacker, 
and security exploit information."
How do we forensically analyze 100,000 apps?
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Cloud Computing — End-user systems won't have the data
Google Apps
■ Microsoft Office 2010
■ Apple Mobile Me
—But they may have residual data!
Problem 4 — Encryption and Cloud Computing 
" "   make it hard to get to the data
41















   
Donations
T r u e C r y p t
Free open-source disk encryption software for Windows 7/Vista/XP, Mac OS X, and Linux
Main Features:
Creates a virtual encrypted disk within a file and mounts it as a real disk. 
Encrypts an entire partition or storage device such as USB flash drive or hard drive.
Encrypts a partition or drive where Windows is installed (pre-boot authentication).
Encryption is automatic, real-time (on-the-fly) and transparent.
Parallelization and pipelining allow data to be read and written as fast as if the drive was not encrypted.
Encryption can be hardware-accelerated on modern processors.
Provides plausible deniability, in case an adversary forces you to reveal the password:
Hidden volume (steganography) and hidden operating system.
More information about the features of TrueCrypt may be found in the documentation.
What is new in TrueCrypt 7.0   (released July 19, 2010)
Statistics (number of downloads) 
 
Site Updated July 31, 2010  •  Legal Notices  •  Sitemap  •  Search
















Encrypt and password protect usb flash
drive , external hard drive
www.magic2003.net
Problem 5 — Time is of the essence. 
Most tools were designed to perform a complete analysis
Find all the files
■ Index all the terms
■ Report on all the data
■ Take as long as necessary!
Increasingly we are racing the clock:
■ Police prioritize based on statute-of-limitations!
■ Battlefield, Intelligence & Cyberspace
operations require turnaround in days or hours.
42
My research focuses on three main areas:
Area #1: Data collection and manufacturing
■ Large data sets of real data enable science.   (+20TB)
■ Small data sets of realistic data enable education, training and publishing.   (<1TB)
Area #2: Bringing data mining and machine learning to forensics
■ Breakthrough algorithms based on correlation and sampling
■ Automated social network analysis (cross-drive analysis)
■ Automated ascription of carved data 
Area #3: Working above and below the files
■ Most work to date is with files
■ Digital Forensics XML (DFXML) 
—Connecting tools
—Representing applications, behaviors, users
—Forensics of bulk data
Emphasis on building tools and working with practitioners.
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Cell Phone and PDA 
Forensics (overview)
Who did you call?
Where have you been?
What did you do?
PDAs and Cellphones: 
Difficult times for computer forensics
Powerful computers
■ 100—1.2 GHz processors
■ 16MB — 1GB of RAM (or more)
■ 500GB — 64GB of Flash
■ Networks: Cellular, Bluetooth, WiFi, IR and near field
■ Cameras; Sensors
Little standardization:
■ Android, iOS, RIM, PalmOS, Windows Mobile, Symbian, RIM, Linux, & others
■ Minor revs of a phone may have radically different data layout
Technical challenges:
■ Old phones are widely used
■ Downloadable Apps; 
■ Some systems lose memory w/o power
■ Smart phones have 2 processors & multiple memory banks
■ Removable media — the phone may not have taken the picture on the SD card
Different phones typically require different tools.
45
Infrastructure:
■ Public Telephone Switched Network
■ Mobile Switching Center
■ Base Station Controller







■ Wi-Fi networks for data & voice
Administrative:
■ Account management and billing
Cell phones are part of a system
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Every part of this system is 
potentially a forensics target
Basic Advanced Smart
OS Proprietary Proprietary Linux, Windows Mobile, Palm OS, Symbian, RIM
PIM Simple Phonebook Phonebook and Calendar Reminder List, Enhanced Phonebook, Calendar
Applications None MP3 Player MP3 Player, Office Document Viewing, &c
Messaging Text Messaging Text with Images Text, Images, Movies
Chat None SMS Chat SMS & Instant Messaging
Email None Via Network Operator’s Service Gateway Via POP or IMAP
Web None Via WAP Gateway Direct HTTP
Wireless IrDA IrDA, Bluetooth IrDA, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi
Software of a typical cell phone:
Source: NIST Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics, p. 9
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Memory Considerations: 







■ Subscriber identity modules (SIMs) 16K-1GB (!)
—Integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID)





■ IMEI - International mobile equipment identifier (*#06#)
—Unique to the GSM device
CDMA:
■ Electronic serial number (ESN)
■ Mobile station ID (MSID) or Mobile identification number (MIN)
■ May be stored in phone (US) or in a CDMA chip (China)
Identity Module Characteristics
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Tools use increasing amounts of sophistication to get data:
■ Use the cell phone’s own keyboard & display (project-a-phone)
■ Download information through the cell phone’s standard ports
—Proprietary Phone; USB; Apple 30-pin
—SIM readers
■ Access cell phone through programmer/proprietary ports
—JTAG
■ Direct access to flash
—Probes & Wires
—“Chip Off”




Forensic Accessories improve “repeatability.”
“StrongHold Box” — RF shielding
■ Prevents phone from calling home
■ Stops remote wipe









■ Device Interface, labels, serial numbers, etc
■ Synchronization software on associated computer
■ Time displayed by phone
3. Select the appropriate tool
4. Extract the data (if possible).
52
Unobstructed Devices
Typically done with a forensically sound tool, if possible
Separately acquire the phone memory & SIM card
Usually requires phone to be turned on — which can cause problems
Source: NISTTIR 7250 53
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“Obstructed Devices” — phones that resist extraction.
Password-protected phones or SIM cards
Blackberrys or other phones with PIN locks
■ Locked SIM chips with unknown “PUK” (PIN Unlock Key) codes
■ Beware remote wipe!
Options:
■ Backdoor from manufacturer / Assistance from the provider
—Some providers will give LE the SIM’s PUK code (GSM)
■ Professionals who know how to attack the hardware
■ Search Internet for developer information or hacker exploits
■ Copies of the data on subject’s PC or in the cloud
Other options:
■ Ask the suspect for the password, PIN, or other information
■ Review seized material
■ Guess (try 1234, etc.)
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Obstructed Devices — Examples
PalmOS version 4.0 or earlier
■ Password easily reversed after memory downloaded during sync
■ Motorola DROID boot loader attack s
■ A developer leaked the boot loader key
■ Load custom ROMs to get around OS locks
■ Nokia handsets:
■ Master password that can be calculated from equipment identifier
■ Netherlands Forensic Institute:
■ Automated Brute Force — A machine “equipped with a robot arm and video camera the 
unit can systematically enter passwords until the correct entry is detected or, in the worst 
case, the keys become damaged.”
■ General-purpose tool for examining memory chips. 
Create a substitute SIM to take over the phone
Forensic SIM Toolkit
■ GSM .XRY SIM Id Cloner
■ TULP 2G SIMIC 
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Typical targets of examination and analysis:
“Pattern of Life”
Investigators are looking for:
■ Subscriber & equipment identifiers
■ Date/time of calls, movements, etc
■ Phonebook
■ Appointment Calendar
■ SMS, Text Messages, Instant Messages
■ Dialed, incoming, & missed call log
■ Electronic mail
■ Photos





















Parabenʼs Cell Seizure Report Wizard
65Source: NISTTIR 7250
Cell Phone Forensics: References & Resources
USG References are out-of-date but useful nonetheless:
■ Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics (NIST SP 800-101)
—May 2007
—http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/Draft-SP800-101.pdf
■ Cell Phone Forensic Tools: An Overview and Analysis (NISTIR 7387)
—March 2007 (!)
—http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/nistir-7387.pdf
■ PDA Forensic Tools: An Overview and Analysis (NISTIR 7100)
—August 2004 (!!)
—http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/nistir-7100-PDAForensics.pdf
Recently published books are better, but not peer reviewed:
■ iPhone Forensics: Recovering Evidence, Personal Data, and Corporate Assets byJonathan A. Zdziarski 
(Paperback - Sep 19, 2008)
■ iPhone and iOS Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Apple iPhone, iPad and iOS 
Devices by Andrew Hoog and Katie Strzempka (Paperback - Jun 30, 2011)
■ Android Forensics: Investigation, Analysis and Mobile Security for Google Android, Andrew Hoog 
(Paperback - June 29, 2011)
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Android Forensic Targets
Youʼve got an Android Phone. Now what?
SIM:
■ Identity information. 
■ Possibly Address Book or SMS records from a previous phone
■ On-board Flash (256M-2GB)
■ Android file system (YAFFS2)
■ Call history; messages; position information; network information; etc
■ Downloaded applications & application data
Removable Flash (1GB-32GB)
■ Downloaded applications & application data
■ Media (songs; video; images); Documents
■ Information from other computers (remember, phone can be a “thumb drive”)
RAM (256M-1GiB)
■ Linux; Dalvik (Java) VM; user programs
■ May be only way to recover encryption keys, passwords, etc.
68
Two approaches for Android Forensics: Online & Offline
Online Analysis: Use Android to analyze Android
Enable USB debugging and debug with Android Debug Bridge (adb)
—http://developer.android.com/guide/developing/tools/adb.html
■ Load an application that extracts data to your analysis machine
■ RAM
—Physical Dump of NAND flash
Offline Analysis: Analyze Android as a storage system
■ Analyze SDCard as a traditional FAT file system
■ Logical analysis of YAFFS2 files
—Less to get, but easier to get at
Which approach you choose depends on:
■ Your goals — conviction, discovery, research
■ Your skill level & available tools
■ Legal requirements (i.e.: will the results be used in court?)
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Flash memory is very different from traditional RAM.
Defining characteristics:
■ Memory written in blocks (100s-1000s of bits per block — think “sectors”)
—Must be erased before it can be written
■ Memory erased in pages (10,000s of bits per page — think 4K pages)
■ Each bit has limited lifetime (typically 1000 — 100,000 cycles)
■ Therefore, writes must be wear leveled
NOR flash (not always present)
■ True random access (direct execution)
■ Low-density (expensive)
■ Boot code can execute directly out of NOR
NAND flash (always present)
■ Block-oriented access
■ High density (Single Layer Cells & Multi Layer Cells)
■ ROM boot code (in the microprocessor) can copy NAND into RAM and execute. 
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There are two-approaches for remapping.
File Level — Flash File System
■ Operating system directly controls writing & erasing. 
■ Files may be proactively moved to assist in leveling
■ JFFS2 (Journaling Flash File System #2); YAFFS (Yet Another Flash File System); 
YAFFS2
Block Level — Flash Translation Layer
■ Flash device appears as a block device
■ Operating system rewrites as normal
■ “Flash Translation Layer” transparently remaps & erases as necessary
■ Used by all SD cards and SSDs
“TRIM” Command
■ Tells FTL that a sector will not be read again
■ Lets OS give SD/SSD “hint.”
■ Implemented in Windows 7 and Linux ext4
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Wear leveling means you can recover data 
after it is deleted and overwritten.
Assume this sequence of events:
echo “file one” > file.1
echo “file two” > file.2
dd if=file1 of=file.2
These commands are executed at the logical layer
YAFFS2 would rewrite the directory entry for “file.2” to point at the 
new flash pages
■ A SSD or SDCard would rewrite the FTL so that the logical block # pointed to by the file.2 
directory entry pointed to the new data





“file one” “file two”
file.1
The MTD has a Flash Translation Layer...
■ ... but flash file systems (JFFS, JFFS2, YAFFS and YAFFS2) go directly to the hardware 
layer.
Android uses the Linux Memory Technology Device 
(MTD) to access flash memory.
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Home › HOWTO Guides › Booting From Flash
Using the Memory Technology Device (MTD)
The Memory Technology Device (MTD) subsystem for Linux provides access to non-volatile memory storage, typically Flash devices. By using a layered
approach, it is possible to support new hardware and devices easily, and have them fully functional with a minimum amount of work. For more information
on MTD see the project's web page. There is also an MTD FAQ, which is also provided as part of the MTD source code or as a daily snapshot.
As MTD is integrated into the Linux kernel, it makes working with Flash devices very simple. For example, Flash can be programmed simply by copying a file
to the Flash device.
MTD also provides several mechanisms for putting a file system into Flash. These are fully functional file systems, which can be written to as well as read
from.
MTD Terminology
The MTD layering is a little complex as shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: MTD layering
The user layer is the API that user code sees, and is exported through the normal Linux device driver API.
The character and block devices give direct access to the Flash, so the application code has to be aware of the Flash characteristics.
The two Flash Translation Layer (FTL) modules provide a normal block device, making it appear that the Flash is completely read/write, and hiding the fact
that to overwrite data involves erasing first. In effect, this makes the Flash appear as a disk, and allows a normal Linux file system to be created in the Flash.
Finally, the Journalling Flash File Systems (JFFS and JFFS2) provide a full file system directly within the Flash. This is the most efficient way to use the Flash,
as JFFS has been written assuming the hardware has the characteristics of Flash, whereas normal file systems are based on the characteristics of a rotating
disk. This allows the semantics of the JFFS file system to be effectively mapped onto the Flash with visibility of the physical Flash layout, enabling it to
support Flash specific concepts such as wear levelling. (This ensures that each Flash region is written and erased approximately the same number of times as
any other region, thus maximizing the lifetime of the Flash.)
The user layer code never accesses the Flash devices directly. Instead they use an internal MTD API to access the hardware device driver layer. This means
that all user layer drivers should work on all devices.
The implementation of the driver layer can be done in two ways:
as a direct implementation, as seen in the M-Systems Disk on Chip (DOC) driver, and also in the test drivers which implement the MTD API using RAM, or
for Flash devices mapped into the address space of the CPU, an extra layering is possible. This divides the driver into chip mappings, which describe how
the Flash devices are mapped into memory and handles banking and partitioning, and the chip driver, which writes to the control registers of the Flash
chip.
Configuring the Kernel for MTD
The configuration described here uses several aspects of MTD, so several kernel options must be enabled. As usual these may be built into the kernel or
STLinux
http://www.stlinux.com/howto/Flash/MTD
“Logical” vs. “Physical” dump.
A logical dump is a dump of the records or files
From data providers
■ From walking the file system
■ adb pull /dir local            # don’t pull /proc
A physical dump is a dump of sectors or pages
YAFFS and YAFFS2:
—raw is the individual flash pages
—16-bytes of Out-of-Band information stored every 512, 1024, or 2048 bytes must be 
removed
—Requires a YAFFS/YAFFS2 implementation to extract files
—FAT32 (or NTFS)
—raw is the individual disk “sectors” (512 or 4096 bytes)
—Requires FAT32 implementation to extract files
—Mount with a loop-back device to access allocated files
■ Use SleuthKit, EnCase, or FTK to access deleted files.
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Sleuthkit — A user-level forensic file system
SleuthKit accesses files in an image without mounting the disk:
■ mmls image.raw — list partitions
■ fls [-o offset] image.raw  [inode] — list files (optionally from a directory)
■ icat [-o offset] image.raw inode — output the contents of an inode to stdout
$ ls -l nps-2009-canon2-gen5.raw




Units are in 512-byte sectors
     Slot    Start        End          Length       Description
00:  Meta    0000000000   0000000000   0000000001   Primary Table (#0)
01:  -----   0000000000   0000000050   0000000051   Unallocated
02:  00:00   0000000051   0000060799   0000060749   DOS FAT16 (0x04)
$ fls -o 51 nps-2009-canon2-gen5.raw








Using Sleuthkit for Android Forensics
Approach #1: MicroSD card
■ Remove the MicroSD card and examine with SleuthKit
■ Important: Use a write blocker to prevent modification to the SD card
■ Advantage: Easy-to-do; no change to SD card
■ Disadvantage: Will not read encrypted .apk files; shutting down may wipe important info
Approach #2: Analyze the Android device via USB
■ Attach the Android device to your computer and select “USB Storage.”
■ One or more partitions corresponding to the Android device may appear
■ Question: Can we use a write blocker to prevent modification? (I don’t know)
■ Advantage: Easy-to-do
■ Disadvantage: May change Android device even with write blocker
Approach #3: Dump the Android device and analyze offline.
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File formats typical on Android Phones
SQLite data files
■ Public domain database holds SQL Schema, Tables, Rows, Columns
■ Journal stored in secondary file
■ Most of today’s tools ignore the journal and deleted data
Internal log (circular buffer in memory)
■ Log Collector (http://code.google.com/p/android-log-collector/ )
■ logcat
adb shell logcat > log.txt
■ aLogCat
Text log files
■ Some third party programs (e.g. DropBox) may store text logs
■ Does the base Android system create text log files?
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Android Forensics References
■ “Recovery of Deleted Data from Flash Memory Devices”, Capt. James Regan, Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. http://simson.net/clips/students/
09Sep_Regan.pdf
■ “Android Forensics: Simplifying Cell Phone Examinations,” Lessard & Kessler, Small 







“Carving” searches for objects based on content, rather 
than on metadata. 








“Carving” searches for objects based on content, rather 
than on metadata. 
Recoverable Word File







Recoverable embedded JPEG 
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File carving is a powerful tool for finding useful pieces of 
information.
What can be carved:
■ Disks & Disk Images
■ Memory
■ Files of unknown format (to find embedded objects)
Objects that can be recovered:
■ Images
■ Text files & documents
■ Cryptographic Keys
Why carve?
■ Directory entries are overwritten
■ Directory entries are damaged
■ File formats aren’t known
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Example: Carving JPEG Files





■ Find all headers
■ Find all footers









[FF D8 FF E0] or [FF D8 FF E1]
[FF D9]



























Header/Footer carving involves saving the data between 
a known header & known footer.
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This strategy is used by foremost and scalpel. 
Possible explanations:
■ This file may be fragmented.
■ The file may have been overwritten. 
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Header/Footer carving involves saving the data between 




This strategy is used by foremost and scalpel. 
Possible explanations:
■ This file may be fragmented.
■ The file may have been overwritten. 
If the file is fragmented, it can be recovered with 
fragment recovery carving
Is fragment reassembly carving important?
We analyzed 400 hard drives to find out. 
Today's file carvers cannot process fragmented files
Is this a problem? We don’t know
We have disk images from many used hard drives
These drives simulate drives taken from production during a search
■ ≈275 had file systems we could analyze when the study was done.
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Files can be fragmented into two or more pieces.
3. The file system itself may not support writing
files of a certain size in a contiguous manner.
For example, the Unix File System will fragment
files that are long or have bytes at the end of
the file that will not fit into an even number
of sectors [1]. Not surprisingly, we found that
files on UFS volumes were far more likely to be
fragmented than those on FAT or NTFS volumes
(Table 2).
Fraction of Total
files on drive Total named
that are fragmented drives files
f = 0.00% 145 17,267
0 < f ≤ 0.01 42 458,736
0.01 < f ≤ 0.10 107 1,115,390
0.1 < f ≤ 1.0 30 385,641
324 1,977,034
Table 1: Distribution of file fragmentation for files
on drives with more than 5 files
3.3 Fragmentation by File Extension
We hypothesized that different kinds of files would
exhibit different kinds of fragmentation patterns. In
particular, we thought that files that were installed
as part of the operating system would have low frag-
mentation rates. Conversely, large files created by the
user, log files, and files written to as databases (such
as DOC, XLS and PST files), would likely have high
fragmentation rates.
Table 3 shows a cross tabulation of fragmentation
rate by file extension for the files in the corpus. As sus-
pected, high fragmentation rates were seen for log files
and PST files, but we were surprised to find that the
most highly fragmented files were TMP files. We sus-
pect that this is because many TMP files were quite
large (note the high standard deviation for file size)
and that temporary files are created throughout a sys-
tem’s lifetime—so some were created after small files
scattered throughout the drive made it impossible to
write the TMP file without fragmentation.
For this purpose of this paper, it is highly significant
that the file types likely to be of interest by forensic
examiners (e.g. AVI, DOC, JPEG and PST) had sig-
nificantly higher fragmentation rates than those files
that are of little interest (BMP, HLP, INF, INI). Thus
is behooves the research community to develop algo-
rithms that work with fragmented files.
3.4 Files Split Into Two Fragments
We use the term bifragmented to describe a file that
is split into two fragments. Bifragmented files rep-
resent an attractive target for automated carving be-
cause these files can be carved using relatively straight-
forward algorithms discussed in Section 5. Table 7
show the number of bifragmented files, the average
file size, and the maximum file size observed in the
corpus for the 20 most popular file extension.
We performed a histogram analysis of the most com-
mon gap sizes between the first and the second frag-
ment and present the overall findings in Table 4. Ta-
bles 5 and 6 show common gap sizes for JPEG and
FAT1 NTFS UFS
# File systems: 219 51 5
# Fragments Number of Files
(contiguous) 1,285,975 502,050 70,222
2 25,151 20,851 10,932
3 4,929 5,622 1,047
4 2,473 3,176 408
5–10 4,340 11,730 658
11–20 1,591 7,001 94
21–100 1,246 10,912 13
101–1000 185 5,672 0
1001– 2 567 0
Total Files: 1,325,892 567,581 83,374
Table 2: Fragmentation of files that could be recov-
ered by Sleuth Kit, by file system type, for file sys-
tems containing more than 5 files. (Note: This table
omits the 8 files found on the single UFS2 file system
in the corpus (drive 620) and the 16 files found on
the single EXT3 file system (drive 1,041). The table
also omits empty files (0 bytes in length), since they
have 0 fragments.)
HTML files, respectively. The gaps tended to repre-
sent 1, 2, 4 or 8 512-byte sectors. We hypothesize that
this gap corresponds to a single FAT or NTFS clusters
that had been already allocated to another file when
the operating system was writing the file that was frag-
mented. This hypothesis appears partially confirmed
by Table 8: with more files with a gap of 8 blocks in
Table 8 than a gap of 8 sectors in 4, it appears that
some of the files with gaps of 16 or 32 sectors in 4 were
actually on file systems with a cluster size of 2 or 4
sectors.
3.5 Highly fragmented files
A small number of drives in the corpus had files that
were highly fragmented. A total of 6,426 files on 62
drives had more than 100 fragments, while 569 files on
12 drives had more than 1000. Surprisingly, most of
these files were large system DLLs and CAB files. It
appears that these files resulted from system patches
and upgrades being applied to drives that were already
highly fragmented. Although we lack algorithms to re-
assemble highly fragmented files, the sectors belonging
to well-known DLLs and CAB files could be eliminated
from a file being carved if one had a database of hash
codes for every sector of well-known files.
4. OBJECT VALIDATION
In order to carve bytes from a disk image into a new
disk file, it is necessary to have some sort of process
for selecting and validating the carved bytes. Fore-
most and Scalpel use sequences of bytes at the be-
ginning and end of certain file formats (file headers
and footers); Mikus enhanced Foremost with a val-
idator for the Microsoft Office internal file structure.
When the carving program finds a sequence of bytes
that matches the desired requirements, the bytes are
stored in a file which is then manually opened and
examined.
In this paper we use the term object validation to
describe the process of determining which sequences
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Log files:
■ Written by appending
Microsoft OLE files:
■ .doc, .xls, .ppt
■ Files designed for update-in-place
Other files likely to fragment:
■ Microsoft Windows Registry
■ sqlite databases (untested)
■ Big files (video)
What typically doesn’t fragment:
■ JPEGs on disks with free space.
file Size of files with 2 fragments:
Ext count avg stddev max
pnf 7,583 41,583 81,108 1,317,368
dll 7,479 221,409 384,758 9,857,608
html 3,417 28,388 66,694 2,505,490
jpeg 2,963 29,673 178,563 6,601,153
gif 2,566 22,133 99,370 3,973,951
exe 2,348 399,528 4,354,053 206,199,144
1 1,125 57,475 130,630 1,998,576
dat 780 291,407 673,906 7,793,936
z 716 74,353 340,808 6,248,869
h 690 16,444 12,232 110,592
inf 683 79,578 101,448 522,916
wav 575 1,949,459 6,345,280 39,203,180
swf 548 62,582 120,138 1,155,989
ttf 540 163,854 649,919 10,499,104
sys 513 1,276,323 12,446,966 150,994,944
txt 480 33,410 275,641 5,978,896
hlp 475 185,259 375,461 3,580,078
tmp 450 206,908 772,290 8,388,608
so 440 103,939 205,617 1,501,148
wmf 418 48,864 49,869 586,414
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 7: Most common files in corpus consisting of
two fragments, by file extension.











Table 8: The most common gap sizes for all bifrag-
mented files, expressed in terms of file system alloca-
tion block size. Block sizes ranged from 512 to 4,096
bytes.
of bytes represent valid Microsoft Office files, JPEGs,
or other kinds of data object sought by the forensic in-
vestigator. Object validation is a superset of file vali-
dation, because in many cases it is possible to extract,
validate and ultimately use meaningful components
from within a file—for example, extracting a JPEG
image embedded within a Word file, or even extract-
ing a JPEG icon from within a larger JPEG file.
4.1 Fast Object Validation
Object validation is a decision problem in which the
validator attempts to determine if a sequence of bytes
is a valid file, by which we mean that a target program
(e.g., Microsoft Word) can open the file and display
sensible information without generating an error.
If one had a fast computer and a fast object valida-
tion algorithm, a simple way to find all contiguous ob-
jects that could be carved from a disk image would be
to pass all possible substrings of bytes from the disk
image through the validator and keep the sequences
that validate. A disk with n bytes has (n)(n−1)2 pos-
sible strings; thus, a 200GB hard drive would require
1.9× 1022 different validations.
A carefully designed carver can eliminate the vast
majority of byte sequences without even trying them.
For example, if it is known that sequences can only
start on sector boundaries, then 511512 = 99.8% of the
strings need never be tried. If the validator does not
generate an error if additional data is appended to the
end of a valid data object, then the carver can simply
try the set of all byte sequences that start on a sector
boundary and extend to the end of the disk image; for
each valid sequence found, the carver can perform a
binary search to rapidly find the minimum number of
bytes necessary for validation. These two assumptions
hold when carving contiguous JPEG images from FAT
and NTFS file systems, since both will only allocate
JPEG at the start of sectors (512-byte boundaries)
and the JPEG decompressor can recognize the end of
a file. Together these two shortcuts would reduce the
number of validation operations for a 200 GB drive
from 1.9× 1022 to 4× 108, plus roughly 40 validations
for each object that is identified. As discussed in the
following section, all JPEG files begin with a distinc-
tive 4-byte sequence. Checking for these sequences is
extremely fast. Only the object candidates with these
headers need be subjected to more time consuming
validations. As a result, all of the contiguous JPEGs
in a disk image file can frequently be found as quickly
as the file can be loaded into the memory system of
a modern computer—typically an hour for every 50
gigabytes or so.
4.1.1 Validating Headers and Footers
Byte-for-byte comparisons are among the fastest op-
erations that modern computers can perform. Thus,
verifying static headers and footers (if they are present)
is an excellent first pass of any validation algorithm.
For example, all JPEG files begin with the hexdec-
imal sequence FF DE FF followed by an E0 or E1; all
JPEG files end with the hexdecimal sequence FF D9.
The chance of these patterns occurring randomly are 2
in 248. A JPEG object validator that checks for these
static sequences can quickly discard most candidate
objects.
Header/Footer validation is not sufficient, however,
since by definition it ignores the most of the file’s con-
tents. Header/Footer validation won’t discover sec-
tors that are inserted, deleted or modified between the
header and footer because these sectors are never ex-
amined. Thus, Header/Footer validation should only
be used to reject a data object. Objects that pass must
be processed with slower, more exhaustive algorithms.
4.1.2 Validating Container Structures
Many files of forensic interest are in fact container
files that can have several internal sections. For ex-
ample, JPEG files contain metadata, color tables, and
finally the Huffman-encoded image [8]. ZIP files con-
tain a directory and multiple compressed files [10].
Microsoft Word files contain a Master Sector Alloca-
tion Table (MSAT), a Sector Allocation Table (SAT),
a Short Sector Allocation Table (SSAT) a directory,
and one or more data streams [16].
As with validating Headers and Footers, validating
container structures can be exceedingly fast. Many
Forensically important files are more likely to be 

















for I in range(0,LEN):
    for J in range(0,LEN-I):
        data = blocks[S:S+I] + blocks[F-J:J]
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Header/Length sectors:  (LEN blocks are found in ZIP & MSOffice)
LEN blocks
Header/Length Carving takes advantage of blocks that 
code a fileʼs length.
Header/Embedded Length Carving:
■ Looks for structures that code length
















NI Blocks K BlocksJ Blocks
for I in range(0,LEN):
    for J in range(0,LEN-I):
        K = LEN - (I+J)
        data = blocks[S:S+I] + blocks[P-J:P+K]
        if valid(data)==True:  save(data) 
PS
Header/Length Fragment Recovery Carving:
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Carving tools available today:
Open Source:
■ PhotoRec - Recovers lost photos from hard drives
■ Scalpel - Improved version of Foremost, by Golden G. Richard III
■ Foremost - Developed by Jesse Kornblum and Kris Kendall at AFOSI
■ bulk_extractor — Feature extractor
Proprietary:
■ Adroit Photo Recovery — Amazing, but only works on JPEGs
■ DataLifter - File Extractor Pro
■ EnCase & FTK — both have limited carving functionality
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Stream-based forensics with 
bulk_extractor
Stream-Based Disk Forensics:
Scan the disk from beginning to end; do your best.
1. Read all of the blocks in order
2. Look for information that might be useful
3. Identify & extract what's possible in a single pass
Advantages:
 No disk seeking
 Read the disk at maximum transfer rate
 Reads all the data — allocated files, deleted files, file fragments
Disadvantages:
 Fragmented files won't be recovered:
—Compressed files with part2-part1 ordering
—FIles with internal fragmentation (.doc)
 A pass through the file system is needed to map contents to file names.
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ZIP part 1ZIP part 2
0 1TB
bulk_extractor: a high-speed disk scanner.
Written in C, C++ and Flex
 Command-line tool
 Linux, MacOS, Windows (compiled with mingw)
Key Features:
 Uses regular expressions and rules to scan for:
—email addresses; credit card numbers; JPEG EXIFs; URLs; Email fragments
—Recursively re-analyzes ZIP components
 Produces a histogram of the results
 Multi-threaded
 Disk is "striped" into pages
—Results stored in mostly-ordered “feature files”
Challenges:
 Must work with evidence files of any size and on limited hardware
 Users can't provide their data when the program crashes
 Users are analysts and examiners, not engineers.
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bulk_extractor output: text files of "features" and context.
email addresses from domexusers:
48198832  domexuser2@gmail.com    tocol>____<name>domexuser2@gmail.com/Home</name>____
48200361  domexuser2@live.com     tocol>____<name>domexuser2@live.com</name>____<pass
48413829  siege@preoccupied.net   siege) O'Brien <siege@preoccupied.net>_hp://meanwhi
48481542  danilo@gnome.org        Danilo __egan <danilo@gnome.org>_Language-Team:
48481589  gnom@prevod.org         : Serbian (sr) <gnom@prevod.org>_MIME-Version:
49421069  domexuser1@gmail.com    server2.name", "domexuser1@gmail.com");__user_pref("
49421279  domexuser1@gmail.com    er2.userName", "domexuser1@gmail.com");__user_pref("
49421608  domexuser1@gmail.com    tp1.username", "domexuser1@gmail.com");__user_pref("
Histogram:
n=579   domexuser1@gmail.com
n=432   domexuser2@gmail.com
n=340   domexuser3@gmail.com
n=268   ips@mail.ips.es
n=252   premium-server@thawte.com
n=244   CPS-requests@verisign.com
n=242   someone@example.com
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bulk_extractor success:
City of San Luis Obispo Police Department, Spring 2010
District Attorney filed charges against two individuals:
 Credit Card Fraud
 Possession of materials to commit credit card fraud
Defendants:
 arrested with a computer
 Expected to argue that defends were unsophisticated and lacked knowledge
Examiner given 250GiB drive the day before preliminary hearing
In 2.5 hours Bulk Extractor found:
—Over 10,000 credit card numbers on the HD (1000 unique)
—Most common email address belonged to the primary defendant (possession)
—The most commonly occurring Internet search engine queries concerned credit card 
fraud and bank identification numbers (intent)
—Most commonly visited websites were in a foreign country whose primary language is 
spoken fluently by the primary defendant. 
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Eliminating false positives:
Many of the email addresses come with Windows!




It's important to suppress email addresses not relevant to the case
Approach #1 — Suppress emails seen on many other drives
Approach #2 — Stop list from bulk_extractor run on clean installs
Both of these methods white list commonly seen emails
 Operating Systems have a LOT of emails. (FC12 has 20,584!)
 Is it wise to give Linux developers a free pass? 
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n=579   domexuser1@gmail.com
n=432   domexuser2@gmail.com
n=340   domexuser3@gmail.com
n=268   ips@mail.ips.es
n=252   premium-server@thawte.com
n=244   CPS-requests@verisign.com
n=242   someone@example.com
Approach #3: Context-sensitive stop list.
Instead of extracting just the email address, extract the context:
 Offset:! 351373329
 Email:! zeeshan.ali@nokia.com
 Context:! ut_Zeeshan Ali <zeeshan.ali@nokia.com>, Stefan Kost <
 Offset:! 351373366
 Email:! stefan.kost@nokia.com
 Context:! >, Stefan Kost <stefan.kost@nokia.com>____________sin
—Here "context" is 8 characters on either side of feature
—
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Total stop list: 70MB (628,792 features; 9MB ZIP file)
Applying it to domexusers HD image:
 # of emails found: 9143 ➔ 4459
http://afflib.org/downloads/feature_context.1.0.zip
We created a context-sensitive stop list for Microsoft 
Windows XP, 2000, 2003, Vista, and several Linux.
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n=579   domexuser1@gmail.com
n=432   domexuser2@gmail.com
n=340   domexuser3@gmail.com
n=192   domexuser2@live.com
n=153   domexuser2@hotmail.com
n=146   domexuser1@hotmail.com
n=134   domexuser1@live.com
n=91    premium-server@thawte.com
n=70    talkback@mozilla.org
n=69    hewitt@netscape.com
n=54    DOMEXUSER2@GMAIL.COM
n=48    domexuser1%40gmail.com@imap.gmail.com
n=42    domex2@rad.li
n=39    lord@netscape.com
n=37    49091023.6070302@gmail.com
n=579   domexuser1@gmail.com
n=432   domexuser2@gmail.com
n=340   domexuser3@gmail.com
n=268   ips@mail.ips.es
n=252   premium-server@thawte.com
n=244   CPS-requests@verisign.com
n=242   someone@example.com
n=237   inet@microsoft.com
n=192   domexuser2@live.com
n=153   domexuser2@hotmail.com
n=146   domexuser1@hotmail.com
n=134   domexuser1@live.com
n=115   example@passport.com
n=115   myname@msn.com
n=110   ca@digsigtrust.com
without stop list with stop list
bulk_extractor: Implemented as a set of C++ classes
Forensic Buffers and Path:
 sbuf_t — Holds data, margin, and forensic path of each page
 pos0_t — Path of byte at sbuf[0]
100 ! ! Offset at 100 bytes
100-GZIP-500! At offset 100, GZIP compressed, 500 bytes further in
 feature_recorder — Holds output for each feature type
Plug-In Scanner System
 Each scanner is a C++ function that can be linked or loaded at run-time(*)
 Simple scanners look for features in bulk data and report them
—scan_accts, scan_aes, scan_bulk, scan_ccns2, scan_email, scan_exif, scan_find, 
scan_headers, scan_net, scan_wordlist
 Scanners can instantiate files:
—scan_kml 
 Scanners can be recursive. 
—scan_base64, scan_gzip, scan_hiberfile, scan_pdf, scan_zip
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bulk_extractor: Speed from multi threading
Primary thread:
 Iterator reads “pages” of forensic data and passes each page to a “worker.”
 Iterators available for:
—raw & splitraw files
—AFF, E01
—Directory Hierarchies
—MD5 is computed automatically as data is read (source validation)
 Generates DFXML file with:
—Tool compile and runtime provenance. 
—Status reports of what is found, errors, etc
Worker Threads:
 One per core
 Automatically figures out how many cores you have.
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Bulk_extractorʼs magic — opportunistic decompression
Most forensic tools recover:
 allocated files
 “deleted” files
 carving of unallocated area
bulk_extractor uses a different methodology:
 Carving and Named Entity Recognition
 Identification, Decompression and Re-Analysis of compressed data
This helps with:
 hibernation files and fragments (hibernation files move around)
 swap file fragments
 browser cache fragments (gzip compression)
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Post-processing the feature files




bulk_diff.py: prepares difference of two bulk_extractor runs
Designed for timeline analysis
 Developed with analysts
 Reports “whatʼs changed.”
—Actually, “whatʼs new” turned out to be more useful
—“whatʼs missing” includes data inadvertantly overwritten
identify_filenames.py: Reports files responsible for features
Requires DFXML run (fiwalk) for disk image








■ “Scientific Knowledge for collecting, analyzing, and presenting evidence to the 
courts” (USCERT 2005)
Anti-Forensics: 




—Of the anti-forensics tool
■ Attack the forensic tool:
—Reveal the presence of the forensic tool or forensic process
■ Disrupt information collection or increase the examiner’s time
■ Cast doubt on a forensic report or testimony
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Physical destruction is a simple anti-forensic technique.
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Overwriting can be used to destroy data.
Overwriting: 
■ Eliminate data or metadata
■ Examples: disk sanitizers; Microsoft Word metadata “washers,” timestamp eliminators
Issues:
■ You must guarantee that data is overwritten and not simply remapped
■ Problem with flash file systems
■ How many times do you need to overwrite?
—DoD standard is 3 times
—Guttman says 2 times with a modern hard drive




Overwrite Everything — DBAN — Darik’s Boot and Nuke
■ http://www.dban.org/
■ A single pass is sufficient







—Overwriting just what matters is notoriously difficult
—Selective overwriting leaves obvious traces




Steganography: Hide data where tools won't look for it.
Data Hiding in File System Structures
■ Slacker — Hides data in slack space
■ FragFS — Hides in NTFS Master File Table
■ RuneFS — Stores data in “bad blocks”
■ KY FS — Stores data in directories
■ Data Mule FS — Stores in inode reserved space
Data Hiding "out of the map"
■ Host Protected Areas (HPA) & Device Configuration Overlay (DCO)
■ Bad block areas of hard drives
■ Graphics RAM
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Approach Two: Cryptography or steganography.
Cryptographic File Systems
■ Built in: FileVault & EFS
■ Add-on: BestCrypt, TrueCrypt, FreeOTFE
Encrypted Network Protocols (SSL, SSH, Onion Routing*)




*Onion routing also protects from traffic 
analysis
109
Cryptographic File Systems are increasingly a problem 
for forensic investigators
Many allow hiding an encrypted file system inside an encrypted file 
system:
■ Easy-to-use transparent encryption (FileVault, EFS, IronKey, TrueCrypt) makes crypto 
easier for both legitimate users and the bad guys
■ The law on forcing people to reveal keys is unclear
TrueCrypt has a “deniable encryption” scheme
It’s design to hide the existence of an encrypted volume from 
someone who might torture you
■ I recommend not using TrueCrypt because you can’t prove that you aren’t using deniable 
encryption
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Anti-Forensics 3: Minimizing the Footprint
Overwriting and Data Hiding are easy to detect
Tools leave tell-tale signs; examiners know what to look for
■ Statistical properties are different after data is overwritten or hidden
AF tools that minimize footprint avoiding leaving traces for later 
analysis
Memory injection and syscall proxying
■ Live CDs, Bootable USB Tokens
■ Virtual Machines—VMWare, QEMU, etc
■ Anonymous Identities and Storage
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Memory Injection and Userland Execve:
Running a program without loading the code.
Memory Injection loads code without having the code on the disk
Buffer overflow exploits — run code supplied as (oversized) input
Userland Execve 
— Runs program without using execve()
— Bypasses logging and access control
— Works with code from disk or read from network
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Syscall proxying: 
Running a program without the code!
Syscall Proxying
■ Program runs on one computer, syscalls executed on another
■ Program not available for analysis
■ May generate a lot of network traffic












Client Kernel Server Kernel
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Live CDs, Bootable USB Tokens, Virtual Machines:
Running code without leaving a trace.
Most forensic information is left in the file system of the running 
computer
These approaches keep the attacker’s file system segregated:
— In RAM (CDs & Bootable USB Tokens)
— In the Virtual Machine file (where it can be securely deleted)
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Anonymous Identities and Storage: 
The attackerʼs data may be anywhere.
Attackers have long made use of anonymous e-mail accounts. 
Today these accounts are far more powerful
Yahoo and GMail both have 2GB of storage
■ APIs allow this storage to be used as if it were a file system
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Simple Storage 
Service (S3) provide high-capability, little-patrolled services to 
anyone with a credit card
■ EC2: 10 ¢/CPU hour (Xen-based virtual machines)
■ S3: 10 ¢/GB-Month
With BGP, it’s possible to have “anonymous IP addresses.”
■ Announce BGP route
■ Conduct attack
■ Withdraw BGP address
■  Being used by spammers today
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Attacking the Investigator: 
AF techniques that exploit CFT bugs.
Craft packets to exploit buffer-overflow bugs in network monitoring 
programs like tcpdump, snort and ethereal
Create files that cause EnCase to crash
Successful attacks provide:
■ Ability to run code on the forensic appliance
■ Erase collected evidence
■ Break the investigative software
■ Leak information about the analyst or the investigation
■ Implicate the investigator
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Attacking the Investigator: 
Denial-of-Service Attacks against the CFT
Any CFT resource whose use is determined by input can be 
overwhelmed
Create millions of files or identities
■ Overwhelm the logging facility
■ Compression bombs — 42.zip














Anti-Forensic Tools can detect 
Computer Forensic Tools: cat-and-mouse.
SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) drives 
report:
■ Total number of power cycles
■ Total time hard drive has been on
Network Forensics can be detected with:
■ Hosts in “promiscuous” mode responding differently
—— to PINGs
—— to malformed packets
—— to ARPs
■ Hosts responding to traffic not intended to them (MAC vs. IP address)









Improve the tools — many CFTs are poorly written
Save data where the attacker can’t get at it:
■ — Log hosts
■ — CD-Rs
Develop new tools:
■ — Defeat encrypted file systems with keyloggers
■ — Augment network sniffers with traffic analysis
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Research directions in Computer Forensics
Environmental Data Survey Projects
■ Phone systems
■ Hard drives & data storage devices
■ Network hosts and traffic
Theory and Algorithm Development:
■ Theoretical basis to forensics (Brian Carrier 2006 PhD)
■ Cross-Drive Analysis (Garfinkel)
■ Carving Fragmented Objects with Validation
Tool Development
■ Easy-to-use tools
■ Batch tools
■ Data correlation
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